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Editorial
Mitigating lockdown challenges in response to COVID-19 in
Sub-Saharan Africa
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) which was first
reported in Wuhan, China at the end of 2019 (Luo et al., 2020) has
spread across the world with remarkable speed, with the World
Health Organization (WHO) officially declaring a pandemic in
March, 2020. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are now
reporting an increasing number of cases, both imported and
acquired locally. As of April 14th, 2020, a cumulative total of
approximately, 10,757 confirmed COVID-19 cases with 520 deaths
have been reported within the WHO African Region, with South
Africa, Algeria and Cameroon recording the highest number of
cases (WHO, 2020a). A recent analysis has indicated that the risk of
transmission of COVID-19 in Africa to be relatively lower than in
other continents (Haider et al., 2020). However, the scale of COVID-
19 infection in the continent and its impact on population health is
still unclear. Routine information systems in many parts of the
region are inadequate, and the current data are likely to
underestimate the true extent of the epidemic. Furthermore,
because it is unclear as to how COVID-19 will interact with
conditions such as malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, one cannot be certain that infection fatality rates in
Africa will be similar to those that have been estimated elsewhere.
Africa will have to contend with the same features of COVID-19
that have made this an extremely difficult pandemic to deal with
elsewhere. This includes the high degree of transmissibility of
COVID-19 and the fact that the virus can be transmitted by
individuals who are asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic (Luo et al.,
2020). These features of COVID-19 mean that standard communi-
cable disease (CD) control measures may often be insufficient to
bring a COVID-19 outbreak under control. While case detection,
contact tracing, physical distancing, hand hygiene, masks, and
selective isolation and quarantine may reduce transmission, many
countries have resorted to so-called ‘lockdown’ measures. This
amounts to varying degrees of restriction on movement and
gatherings of citizens to reduce transmission risks and to reduce
the reproductive rate of an epidemic below 1.
Lockdown in the context of COVID-19 was first implemented in
Wuhan on January 23rd, 2020, and then extended to the whole of
Hubei province, helping to bring the epidemic in China under
control quite rapidly (WHO, 2020b). Since then, a lockdown has
been deemed necessary to prevent health systems in many high-
income countries from being overwhelmed by COVID-19. Where
this lockdown was early in the importation cycle through the
closure of air travel, the disease was also quickly brought under
control, with very few deaths recorded, an example being New
Zealand. However, many questions remain about the extent to
which ‘lockdown’ is feasible, sustainable, and tolerable in the long
term, and whether its disruption of normal social and economic life
may produce more harm than the virus itself. The high pre-existing
burden of disease and poverty in SSA, coupled with its under-
resourced and fragmented health systems, also mean that African
countries face additional challenges in controlling COVID-19 and
implementing lockdown measures.
This paper examines and discusses the feasibility, effectiveness,
and appropriateness of implementing lockdown in SSA. To begin
with, it defines and describes what is meant by ‘lockdown’ and
how it relates to other CD control measures. It then discusses how
lockdown might work to either mitigate or suppress COVID-19
transmission, and the opportunities and challenges entailed in
doing so. Lastly, the paper discusses some tentative conclusions
and recommendations.
Over the past three months, the term ‘lockdown’ has become
common parlance across the world and has been assimilated into
multiple languages. However, it is not precisely defined. In fact, as
recently as March 25th, 2020, the WHO was using the phrase ‘so-
called lockdown measures’ (WHO, 2020c). A cursory examination
of the academic literature also indicates no clear or universally-
accepted definition of the term. We can also observe that neither
WHO’s 2018 guidelines for a national pandemic influenza
preparedness (WHO, 2018), nor its 2017 Guidelines for Pandemic
Influenza Risk Management (WHO, 2017) includes any mention of
lockdown at all. This lack of definition and clarity is surprising,
especially given the widespread reference to varying degrees of
lockdown, such as ‘total lockdown’ and ‘partial lockdown,’ or ‘tight
lockdown’ and ‘loose lockdown.’ It is also notable that the
relationship between lockdown and other CD control measures
is unclear.
We have therefore constructed a definition of lockdown, and
related this to other CD control measures. We define it as a set of
measures to reduce community transmission of COVID-19 that are
compulsory and which are applied indiscriminately to the general
population. This definition excludes measures that are compulsory
but which are targeted at individuals or segments of the
population that are deemed at high risk. By this definition, one
can isolate three lockdown measures that are relevant to
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COVID-19: (i) geographical containment; (ii) home confinement;
and (iii) the closure of social, educational and economic activities,
and prohibition of mass gatherings. Although separate, there is a
degree to which these measures overlap and operate in synergy
with each other. However, each of these measures exists across a
spectrum ranging from being draconian at one end, to being
lenient at the other.
The term lockdown is perhaps most associated with the
decision of the Chinese authorities to stop the movement of people
in and out of Wuhan City. This geographical containment (cordon
sanitaire) of a city from the rest of the country was later extended
to the entire province of Hubei (WHO, 2020c). The aim of such
containment is to prevent epidemic hotspots from spreading the
virus to other parts of a country or region. The degree of
enforcement and use of sanctions to deter or punish transgressors
are important details of the policy and may depend on the extent to
which the policy is socially acceptable as well as on the
government’s capacity to monitor and police compliance. There
may be less or no restriction for people traveling into an area that
has been put on lockdown, and exemptions made for workers
providing critical services such as maintaining the flow of food and
other essential commodities into the lockdown area.
The containment of a defined geographical area is often
accompanied by a requirement for home confinement. This policy
may also span across the draconian-lenient spectrum, with
exemptions allowed for key workers and their children, and
allowances for people to leave their homes for certain prescribed
activities. The term ‘curfew’ has sometimes been used to describe
measures aimed at confining people to their homes or other indoor
facilities. The third measure is the closure of schools, universities,
sporting events, shops, restaurants, cinemas and theatres, and the
prohibition of mass gatherings. The extent to which these
measures are enforced, as well as the degree to which exemptions
from these measures are permitted, can vary. In some countries,
only mass gatherings above a specific size are prohibited; and
certain types of businesses are allowed to continue opening.
There is a lot of variation in how lockdown is implemented. In
addition to where they are positioned on the draconian-lenient
spectrum for each measure, countries may vary in how they choose
to combine the three measures as a single integrated lockdown
strategy. Also, lockdown will vary according to what measures are
put in place to mitigate the harms of lockdown. These include
direct psychosocial and physical injuries associated with contain-
ment, confinement, loss of important socio-cultural activities, and
economic hardship (Brooks et al., 2020). These direct injuries are
aggravated by indirect ones associated with the impacts of
lockdown on society, which include economic recession, reduced
access to food and other basic needs, the aggravation of social
tensions, disruption to education, and the erosion of civil liberties.
Measures to mitigate these unwanted effects of lockdown may
include enabling children to continue their schooling online,
providing welfare support to poorer households that have lost
income, and introducing fiscal measures to keep the economy
going and ensure essential healthcare. Such measures are a
critically important aspect of lockdown, although they tend to be
neglected.
Total lockdown is unlikely to be accepted voluntarily by a
majority of the population in SSA, owing to its highly disruptive
nature. This is made worse by the fact that some of the countries
which have implemented lockdown, have not put forward any
clear strategy to support their populations, particularly the (most)
vulnerable segments. As the epidemic progresses and many
unknowns around its potential impact are resolved, context-
specific measures should assume a more influential role in
mitigation to avoid the unintended consequences of lockdown
and other externalities. With this scenario in mind, it is essential
that national governments in SSA carefully evaluate the costs and
benefits of stringent measures, with constant monitoring of the
situation.
As an increasing number of SSA countries contemplate stricter
containment strategies, it is critical to reflect on some salient
features of the COVID-19 pandemic in the light of the experiences
and circumstances in these countries. There are a few critical facts
that decision-makers in SSA must take into consideration as the
options are weighed. Country-specific risk assessments need to be
undertaken to provide evidence for decision-making. This is an
important take away from the different trajectories of the outbreak
in several European and other countries, which evolved in
response to country-specific measures. In this regard, a vital issue
for public health experts is helping policymakers decide on the
main objectives of mitigation, for instance minimizing morbidity
and associated mortality, or avoiding an epidemic peak that
overwhelms healthcare services, or keeping the effects on the
economy within manageable levels, or flattening the epidemic
curve (Anderson et al., 2020). So, the choice is between accepting
spread and allowing herd immunity to develop and accepting a
certain loss or attempting suppression.
In any case, setting the priorities should drive the choices of
mitigation strategies (Hollingsworth et al., 2011). Thus, it is a matter
of SSA countries predicting whether the relatively youthful
population is resilient enough to withstand the disease and perhaps
instituting protective measures only for the more vulnerable cohort
of aged people. The latter could be appealing in many low-and-
middle-income countries, but it is difficult to justify without
knowing its potential impact on the outcomes. Drastic measures
could benefit from an informed risk assessment that identifies and
isolate the most vulnerable population segments. In the SSA context,
whenever the scale of the COVID-19 crisis becomes apparent and
reaches the stage when a countrywide lockdown might be
inevitable, the adoption of a risk-based strategy could favor partial
lockdown by identifying ‘zones,’ while keeping up economic
activities in other areas or sectors of the country.
To control the spread of COVID-19 in the long run, continued
compliance with physical distancing coupled with other personal
behavioral measures will be essential. Moreover, for communities
to comply with directives for self-quarantine, self-isolation,
physical distancing, and limited travel over a possibly indefinite
future, SSA governments must fulfill their reciprocal duties to
make compliance safe and feasible. Effective surveillance coun-
trywide and a trusted and transparent source of information is
critical to regularly convey accurate information on the country’s
pandemic situation, the known and unknown risks as well as what
is being done to learn more and what are the measures in place to
control the spread of COVID-19.
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